

# **Constructing a Philanthropy-scale: Social Responsibility and Philanthropy**

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## **Summary**

Philanthropy expresses long-term commitments with public goods. Key motives for philanthropy concern stewardship and social responsibility for the well-being of society as a whole. These motives have rarely been studied. Instead, previous research on giving and volunteering has used measures of personal motives for prosocial behavior in interpersonal relations. Philanthropy however, often benefits unknown strangers or nonprofit organizations. We argue that feelings of civic duty and social responsibility, labeled ‘stewardship’ in the Christian tradition, are important motives for philanthropy that are more central to the definition of philanthropy and therefore deserve attention. In the present paper, we introduce such a “philanthropy-scale”. Using data from the first two waves of the “Giving in the Netherlands Panel Survey” (2001 and 2003), we find that in spite of the moderate reliability of the scale (.55), the test-retest reliability over a two year period is also moderate (.43). Social responsibility has positive relations to other prosocial motives for philanthropy (high internal validity). Most importantly, social responsibility has predictive validity for philanthropic behavior (external validity). Our philanthropy scale is more strongly correlated with philanthropy than other attitude scales, measuring prosocial motives such as altruism, trust, or social value orientation.

## **Introduction**

Philanthropy, defined briefly as: private action for the public good (Payton, 1988) covers a behavior more far-reaching than interpersonal relationships. More precisely, philanthropy stands for the contributions (money, time, goods, expertise), voluntarily given to the public good, serving primarily that public good (Schuyt 2003:25). The problem of “pureness” of philanthropic efforts – is it real sacrifice or is philanthropy strategic fiscal behavior? – may be solved by the notion that philanthropy primarily serves the public good.

### *A sociological perspective on philanthropy*

Philanthropy expresses long-term commitments with the welfare of others and society in general. How do such commitments arise? Emile Durkheim, one of the founding fathers of sociology, argued at the beginning of the twentieth century in his classical work on suicide that social bonds in intermediary groups such as the family, the village, religion, and politics, create feelings of belonging (Durkheim, 1897). In the 1950s, Homans and Gouldner studied reciprocity in social interactions at the micro-level (Homans, 1958; Gouldner, 1960). Many social relations can be seen as a form of direct or indirect exchange. Although both scholars are well-known for their reliance on principles of self-interest, they also point to the role of ‘doing something for nothing’ (Gouldner, 1967) and feelings of social responsibility (Homans, 1974). Sometimes, people contribute to the well-being of others, even when they cannot be sure whether their contributions will ever pay off. Based on the original theory of Durkheim, we argue that such contributions to the well-being of society in general arise from social bonds in specific intermediary groups. These groups prescribe contributions to the own group as laudable. Durkheim argued that the stronger the degree of cohesion in intermediary groups, the higher the degree of norm conformity. Successive scholars have specified the abstract concept of cohesion in theories on social networks, reference groups, and social capital. In line with these theories is the observation that more frequent church attendees give and volunteer more often and contribute higher amounts of time and money to religious organizations (Jackson, Bachmeier & Wood, 1995; Park & Smith, 2000; Bekkers & Schuyt, 2004). Denominational differences in religious contributions are due to differences in the frequency of church attendance (Jackson, Bachmeier & Wood, 1995; Park & Smith, 2000; Bekkers & Schuyt, 2004). However, most social groups also prescribe solidarity with outgroup members as laudable. In the Christian tradition, the parable of the Good Samaritan often serves as an articulation of this norm. Hence, social integration in religious groups also increases contributions to non-religious charitable causes – at least in the Netherlands. Strictly orthodox or ‘fundamentalist’ groups are an exception to this rule, but these are few in number in the Netherlands. Durkheim already noticed a decline of cohesion in several intermediary groups in the early twentieth century, and concerns about such a decline have continued to surface in the remainder of the previous century (e.g., Wirth, 1938; Fukuyama, 1999; Putnam, 2000). However, Durkheim also noticed that the decline of cohesion in intermediary groups seemed to hold pace with an increase in a more abstract feeling of connection with others. Simmel’s theory on cross-cutting social circles suggests the mechanism for this change: in modern society, citizens become affiliated with a higher number of groups, lowering the sense of identification with each of them, but increasing feelings of involvement with society in general. Philanthropy is the modern expression of such feelings. Philanthropy relies on feelings of civic duty, stewardship and social responsibility for the well-being of society as a whole. The study of philanthropy should therefore include a theory on how man as a societal being becomes concerned for the well-being of society as a whole. We think such a theory should be of a mainly sociological nature.

### *Previous research on motives for philanthropy*

In 1990 Piliavin and Charng published their article “Altruism: A Review of Recent Theory and Research” (Piliavin and Charng 1990). They focused at the question if the altruistic personality does exist. For that reason they scrutinized literature and research in the field of sociology, economics, political science and social psychology. In fact, they limited themselves: “Our emphasis will be mainly on the social psychology and human development literatures, although we also discuss issues in social dilemmas, public goods provision, philanthropy, and voluntarism” (Piliavin and Charng 1990:29). In their article a number of definitions were presented, like the psychological ones: “Differences in the definitions of psychologists – who have been unable to agree on a single definition of altruism – involve the relative emphasis on two factors: intentions and the amount of benefit or costs to the actor (Krebs 1987). Bar-Tal (1985-1986) notes that, with few exceptions, most of those who emphasize the motivational aspect of altruism agree that: “altruistic behavior (a) must benefit another person, (b) must be performed voluntarily, (c) must be performed intentionally, (d) the benefit must be the goal by itself, and (e) must be performed without expecting any external reward” (Piliavin and Charng 1990:29-30). Conditions (d) and (e) are rarely met in the real world of giving and volunteering. Charitable contributions are not only motivated by the desire to make the recipients of such contributions better off. In many cases, other motives are more prominent, such as the approval of others or social status obtained by giving (Harbaugh, 1998; Bekkers, 2004a) or the desire to have an impact on the lives of others (Duncan, 2004). There are hardly any cases – except those carefully created in the experiments of social psychologists (Batson, 1998) – in which altruistic concern about the well-being of others is the only source of reward for philanthropy. Moreover, altruistic motives seem to play a rather limited role in philanthropy (Ribar & Wilhelm, 2002; Bekkers, 2004a). On the other hand, this does not prove that all philanthropy is ultimately driven by self-interest. Although altruistic motivation is unlikely in many cases, it is likely that other types of other-regarding preferences are important motives in such cases. To be sure, the recipients of philanthropic contributions are often not known personally – in case of contributions to health charities or international poverty relief charities – or are not a specific group of people at all – in case of contributions to charities advocating human and animal rights or environmental conservation. Contributions to such causes are unlikely to pay off for the individual contributor, not even in the long run. We argue that feelings of civic duty and social responsibility are an important type of other-regarding preferences that motivate philanthropy. We will show that these motives cluster together in one scale that is related to other prosocial motives but has uniquely identifiable effects on multiple types of philanthropy.

### **Theoretical background**

Sociologists have studied issues in three main categories: issues that concern the degree of *cohesion* in societies; issues concerning the degree of *inequality* in societies; and issues concerning the *mode of production and reallocation*. A sociological perspective on philanthropy requires attention to elements in these three categories.

### *Philanthropy as the expression of social cohesion*

We have discussed Durkheim’s theory on social cohesion above. We would like to stress here that social cohesion is not a static, exogenously given property of groups. While Durkheim’s theory is often used to explain norm conform behavior as a function of cohesion, norm conformity also strengthens the degree of cohesion in groups. People feel more involved with the group they have just contributed to, and hence, will endorse the norms of this group more strongly. This is the intuition that also guides modern debates on social capital (i.e.,

participation in voluntary associations) as sources of trust (Putnam, 2000). In future work, we will study how contributions change prosocial values; in the present article, however, we assume that the effects of social norms on behavior is stronger than the other way around (as Brehm & Rahn (1997) found in their analysis of social trust). Below we will provide some evidence for this claim with regard to feelings of social responsibility.

We move on to discuss the work of an early US successor of Durkheim. In the 1920s, Talcott Parsons was one of the first American sociologists to study the European sociological tradition, just before many European sociologists fled the nazis. Parson's studies present a very abstract, theoretical analysis of society. These works are rather difficult to read, and do not lead to easily testable hypotheses. Dutch sociologists mostly know Parsons from his critique on Durkheim that norm-conform behavior is not merely the result of concurrent social integration, but is also rooted in socialization experiences of individuals (Ultee, Arts & Flap, 2003). Here, we concentrate on other aspects of Parson's work. In "The Social System" (1951) Parsons distinguishes four social prerequisites for social systems like societies to survive, namely: adaptation, goal attainment, integration and pattern maintenance. If we "translate" those functions to actual societal activities, then adaptation is associated with economic performances, goal attainment with politics and policies, while integration refers to social security and the problem of cohesion. Pattern-maintenance may stand for socialization, education and the preservation of culture and nature. Philanthropy concerns the last two functional prerequisites: "integration" en "pattern-maintenance". In the spirit of Parons, philanthropy contributes to the maintenance of core social functions of society as well as at the core ecological functions, like nature preservation. Those functional requirements are relevant on the national and international arena and they are relevant now and in the future (intergenerational relationships). Sociobiologists and evolutionists explain prosocial behavior with reference to its survival value for social groups: (inter) generational solidarity makes communities stronger (Trivers, 1985). Historians and sociologists have also pointed out that integration and cohesion increase the chance of survival of societies (De Swaan, 1988; Elias, 1937). Philanthropy, thus, expresses much more the sociological dimensions of society as a social system; it contributes to system prerequisites which are "sui generis", without which society cannot survive. The philanthropic goals distinguished in the "Giving USA" study as well as in the "Giving in the Netherlands" (GIN) study may be seen as operationalization of those functional prerequisites:

- *Social functions:*
  - Socialisation: education, human services, public society benefit, international aid
  - Healthcare: health and medical research
  - Culture: arts, culture, and humanities, religion, sports
- *Ecological functions:*
  - Environment, animals

*The philanthropy scale aims to measure the attitude of personal responsibility to the public good, more specifically, to the social and ecological functions of society.*

### *Social inequality in philanthropy*

Of course, philanthropy is not only a function of integration in social groups; resources also matter. In order to give away money, one needs to have money in the first place. Indeed, studies on philanthropy always reveal positive effects of income and the level of education on charitable giving. The latter effect is interesting, because it usually persists when income is controlled for – eliminating the possibility that effects of education are due to the higher income that is earned by the higher educated (Bekkers, 2004a; Brown, 2001; Rooney, Steinberg & Schervish, 2002). Neither can effects of education be explained as the result of social cohesion. The higher educated tend to have less dense, more extensive, and more heterogeneous networks, consisting of a higher proportion of non-kin (Lin, 2001; Bekkers, Völker, Van der Gaag & Flap, 2005). In such networks, social pressure to conform to group norms is smaller. Indeed, the effect of education on giving and volunteering also persists when social pressure is controlled (Bekkers, 2005).

Then what does explain the effect of education, if it is not income or social pressure? Sociologists have noted before long that the positive relation between social status and philanthropy is more than merely a matter of resource availability or social cohesion. In the Dutch ‘Golden Age’ (17th century), the very rich financed orphan houses and almshouses for the poor (Van Leeuwen, 1995). Local sewage systems were also paid for by rich inhabitants of Dutch commercial cities. Although one may argue that providing housing and hygiene as basic needs for survival was an effective strategy to reduce the threat that the rich experienced from the poor in a time of strong social inequality, one may also argue that such contributions were inspired by feelings of social responsibility (next to religious motives). Wealth and a higher social status creates responsibilities not only for the welfare of those who cannot survive on their own, but also for the provision of culture. Culture and the arts have a long historical tradition of patronage, dating back to ancient Greece, where the rich paid dramatists to write and direct plays for ‘the people’. Homans (1974) described the principle of ‘noblesse oblige’: those who earn more, are expected to contribute more to public goods by society.

As in Durkheim's theory, social status is not only a ‘cause’ of philanthropy, but also a consequence. Acting as a Maecenas enhances social status. In the 1930s, Veblen documented conspicuous consumption among the ‘leisure class’, and concluded: “ostensible works of disinterested public spirit are no doubt initiated and carried on with a view primarily to the enhance repute or even to the pecuniary gain, of their promoters”. This view has recently gained attention among economists (Harbaugh, 1998). Large donations to nonprofit organizations such as hospitals and universities are often remembered by naming the physical results of these donations after their donors. Small donations in a large variety of nonprofit organizations and charities are made public by naming the donors in donor magazines and newsletters. These practices are rather uncommon in the Netherlands. Data from the ‘Giving in the Netherlands Panel Survey’, which we will present below, indicate that two fifths of the Dutch population *never* talks about donations to charities (Schuyt, 2005). Many charities do not identify the names of large donors in their magazines, and many large donations by individuals are made on the condition that the name of the donor is not made public. In the Netherlands, anonymous giving is considered as more laudable than publicly announced giving. However, there are signs that the times are changing. The yellow wristbands sold by the Lance Armstrong Foundation, a charity fighting cancer named after a popular racing cyclist, are becoming very popular in the Netherlands, especially among youth.

Although we are somewhat skeptic with regard to the status-explanation a priori, we investigate the role of social status as a mediator for the effect of education, controlling for income. We also control for verbal intelligence, to see whether the effect of education is due to cognitive capacities instead of a social mechanism.

### *Philanthropy as a result of changes in the mode of production and reallocation*

It seems hard to explain philanthropic contributions with reference to the purely individual selective incentives, as Olson (1965) noticed as well. Rather, we think that people's general feelings of involvement with society as a whole motivate contributions to remote causes, the effects of which are not visible in the short run. Although these feelings are experienced by individuals, they are rooted in social connections with other people and macro-level social structure.

Welfare states in Western Europe are in transition. Demographic changes, growing wealth, cultural and political developments at national as well as European level trigger fundamental shifts in economic, social and political institutions. As a result the constituencies of the social arrangements are changing: responsibilities are re-estimated; sources of financing are re-allocated. The "public good", the core services of welfare states will, in the future, financially rely on three sources of contributions: government funding, fees and charges, and philanthropy (Salamon and Anheier 1999). Private contributions to the public good are getting weight in welfare states in western Europe. Citizens have become less satisfied with government initiatives to provide public goods as a response to market failures because of increasing concerns about the bureaucratic procedures that seem to come inevitably with government intervention. After World War II, the dominant ideology in the Netherlands about the provision of public goods was one of government intervention. A strong and encompassing welfare state was created, caring for its citizens 'from the cradle to the grave'. The popularity of this ideology declined in the economic recession of the 1980s, and came under further attack in recent years – again, in conjunction with an economic recession and the prospect of a strongly growing burden on the welfare state due to the ageing of the population. Cutbacks on government subsidies to nonprofits in the 1980s as well as the more recent cutbacks were accompanied by the call for civic renewal and own initiative of citizens from the Christian Democratic Prime Ministers Lubbers and Balkenende. While Christian Democrats support this call based on the value of social responsibility, their coalition partners from the economically conservative Liberal Democratic party (VVD) support the call from the value of self-reliance. These two motives are very different from each other. Self-reliance ideology argues that citizens who receive government assistance in the form of a range of public services are discouraged to care for themselves. In this view, a limit to the role of the state is a value in itself. Self-reliance ideology is attractive for those who feel they have earned their own success by making the most of the opportunities they have encountered in life. Psychologists call the lay theory explaining behavior with personal qualities of the actor 'dispositional attribution' (Ross, 1977). People making dispositional attributions are more likely to have an 'internal locus of control' (Rotter, 1966) and to hold a 'belief in a just world' (Lerner & Miller, 1985). People succeed in life because of their own efforts, and because society rewards people for their efforts, they get what they deserve. Likewise, people fail because they did not try hard enough, and do not deserve success. Dispositional attributions for success and failure offer 'rationalizations' of social inequality and poverty that are attractive for those who do not want to contribute (either through government intervention or private philanthropy) to alleviating these problems. After all, those who did not try hard enough to succeed in life do not deserve support from others. As a rule, people overestimate the force of personal qualities (and underestimate the force of external constraints) when they explain their own and other's behavior (Ross, 1977). However, some people are more likely to make dispositional attributions than others. We expect that a dispositional attribution style correlates negatively with accepting personal responsibility for the well-being of others. Those who think that people get what they deserve are more likely to decline social responsibility.

Although values of self-reliance and social responsibility lead to opposite views on the role of philanthropy, they both support the withdrawal of the state from public goods provision in many respects. It seems that social responsibility is more popular than self-reliance, because philanthropy has become a sizeable source of income for non-profits. Wealthy people, the entrepreneurial wealthy as well as ordinary people and middle class people – in short: citizens – are getting more and more involved in the common good. The successive ‘Giving in the Netherlands’ Surveys, conducted every two years by the Vrije Universiteit since 1993 (Schuyt, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003), show a strong increase in the amount of money donated to charities and nonprofits.

The public good can be served by different societal subsystems. Generally speaking, the economy (the market), politics and policies (the government), kinship (the family system) or philanthropy are alternative auspices. In that way, social responsibility, expressed in philanthropic behavior may fill the gap that government withdrawal has created. Public services in sectors in which government intervention has diminished – arts and culture, human services, sports, and the environment, but not in religion and education – will be maintained by philanthropy.

Of course, government funding will remain dominant for core welfare issues. Now that the scope of government intervention narrows, fees will increase in order to keep up the level of services provided. In addition, we believe the role for philanthropy will increase. Philanthropy will retake its place in providing public goods as it did in the past (Van Leeuwen, 1995). This profound transformation of the welfare states in western Europe influences directly philanthropic behavior of individuals (Luhmann 1975). We conjecture that feelings of civic duty, stewardship and social responsibility are increasingly dominant motives for philanthropy in Europe in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This role will be most prominent in sectors from which the government has withdrawn in recent decades.

### *Hypotheses*

The foregoing ‘petite sociologie de philanthropie’ gives rise to several clusters of hypotheses. First, based on Durkheim’s theory on cohesion, we expect that integration in intermediary groups will foster feelings of social responsibility for the well-being of society. Specifically:

*H1. Citizens who are members of religious groups, especially the smaller Protestant churches, and citizens who attend religious services more often, will endorse social responsibility more strongly than non-religious individuals.*

*H2. Married citizens, and citizens with children will endorse social responsibility more strongly than those who are not married and/or do not have children.*

*H3. Citizens living in smaller communities will endorse social responsibility more strongly than those living in more urban areas.*

*H4. Citizens who have been raised in a more religious environment, will endorse social responsibility more strongly than those who were raised in a more secular environment.*

Secondly, based on the insight that higher social status gives citizens social responsibility for others, we expect that

*H5. Citizens with a higher level of education will endorse social responsibility more strongly than those with lower levels of education*

*H6. Citizens from households with a higher income will endorse social responsibility more strongly than those from lower income households*

*H7. Citizens with a higher occupational status will endorse social responsibility more strongly than those with lower social status*

*H8. Children from higher educated parents will endorse social responsibility more strongly than children from lower educated parents*

The discussion of changes in the mode of production and public goods provision leads to several hypotheses on the effects of social responsibility that cannot be tested in the present paper, such as the claim that the philanthropic sector will continue to increase in the coming years and that social responsibility will become a more important motive in society in general and in politics and philanthropy in particular. These hypotheses should be investigated when a longer time series of data have become available. At present, we can test the following hypotheses:

*H9. Social responsibility increases donations to charitable causes.*

*H10. An internal locus of control (dispositional attribution) decreases donations to charitable causes.*

*H11. Social responsibility is more strongly related to contributions to arts and culture, human services, sports, and the environment, than to contributions in the sector of religion and education.*

## **Data and methods**

The 'Giving in the Netherlands Panel Survey' provides detailed information on charitable giving and volunteering activities of a representative sample of individuals in Dutch households. The first wave was held in 2002 (n=1,707); a second in 2004 (n=1,316) and a third wave will be held in 2006. An analysis of panel attrition showed that leaving the panel was not associated with social responsibility or the amount donated (Bekkers, 2004b). Respondents were selected from a pool of about 70,000 individuals from 40,000 households available to NIPO (Netherlands' Institute of Polling research). Households in the pool receive a computer with Internet-connection in exchange for participation. Self-administered polling surveys are offered weekly to different subsamples of the pool. Completing a survey is rewarded with a number of token points depending on the length of the survey completed. At the end of the survey, the points can be exchanged for a voucher, or, alternatively, for a donation to a charitable cause.

### *Measuring social responsibility: the Philanthropy Scale*

In both waves of the GINPS, we measured feelings of social responsibility with the 'Philanthropy Scale', shown in table 1. Items 1 and 2 refer to intergenerational solidarity. Items 3 and 4 refer to concerns about a decline in solidarity in society. Items 5 to 8 refer to personal responsibility for the well-being of others versus responsibilities of other institutions (politics, government, businesses). Agreement with solidarity between generations, concerns about declining cohesion, and accepting personal responsibility are considered as three aspects of social responsibility.

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

Both GINPS waves contained measures of a number of other prosocial motives for philanthropic behavior, such as the 'altruism-scale' (Drenth and Kranendonk, 1974; Lindeman, 1995), originally from the Survey of Interpersonal Values (Gordon, 1976) and a measure of social value orientations (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). Both scales are attitude-scales which measure prosocial motives in interpersonal behavior. The altruism scale is based on social-psychological theories and the social value orientation-scale is based on game theory. In the analyses reported in the present paper, we also included

measures of a broad range of other prosocial motives available in the GINPS that should be related positively to social responsibility. A description of these other measures of motives for philanthropy can be found elsewhere (Bekkers & Schuyt, 2004).

An important difference between the measures of motives for philanthropy in the two waves is their place in the questionnaire. Because an experiment on questionnaire order in the first wave (Bekkers, 2004c) showed that the predictive value of social value orientations was much larger when they were assessed in a separate questionnaire session preceding the questionnaire on giving and volunteering, we decided to measure in the second wave all other-regarding preferences and motives for philanthropy in a separate session preceding the giving and volunteering questionnaire.

### *Measuring donations*

The GINPS contains an extensive ‘Method and Area’-module to measure donations to charitable causes and nonprofit organizations. Previous research has shown that such modules reveal a higher incidence of giving and higher amounts donated (Rooney, Steinberg & Schervish, 2001, 2002; Bekkers & Wiepking, 2004), probably because donors are aided with recalling donations (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2004). We investigate the effects of social responsibility on three types of criterion variables: (1) whether households had made donations to charitable causes in eight different sectors in the preceding calendar year (2003); (2) the total amount donated to organizations in these sectors; (3) the total amount donated to 64 specific charities in the Netherlands, mentioned by name. The list included the 30 largest charities in the Netherlands, as well as a number of 34 other charities that were selected to represent (groups of) beneficiaries ranging from the most disadvantaged (e.g., the homeless) to the relatively well-off (visitors of musea). Churches were not included in the list.

### *Reliability*

We conducted factor analyses and reliability analyses on the items in the Philanthropy Scale measured in both waves of the GINPS. Unrestricted factor analyses indicated that two dimensions were present in the items, a dimension on which the positively formulated items loaded high and a dimension on which the negatively formulated items loaded high. Reliability analyses confirmed that in both waves, the positive and negative items clustered together. This result often occurs in scale construction, and could indicate that acquiescence bias is a problem in the data. Acquiescence bias occurs when respondents tend to agree with positively formulated statements and tend to disagree with negatively formulated statements (irrespective of their content). Because we expected a one dimensional solution, and the two dimensional solution seemed to be a result of response style rather than of item content, we chose to force a onedimensional solution in the factor analysis. These solutions explained a rather low proportion of variance in the responses to the items.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the reliability of the scales was not very high (.55 in 2002 and .57 in 2004).

INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

In both waves, item 4 had a low communality and lowered the reliability of the scale as a whole. Consequently, we removed this item from the scales in both waves. We think that the item was formulated in a too complicated way for most respondents, including two difficult words and a negation.

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<sup>1</sup> This problem can be solved by assuming in a structural equation (or ‘Lisrel’) model that next to the substantial dimensions in the data, a third latent variable, the tendency to acquiesce, affects the responses to the individual items (Cambré, Welkenhuysen-Gybels, Billiet &, 2003).

The correlation between the scales over a period of two years – the time lag between the two waves of the GINPS – was .434. Given the low reliability of the two scales, this correlation is quite high. Correcting for unreliability, a rough estimate of the ‘true’ correlation between the latent variables is .77 (.43 divided by .56). This indicates that social responsibility is quite stable over time. We investigated the stability of the scale more in detail by comparing the proportion of respondents who agreed with the items in both waves.

INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

Table 3 shows changes in positive and negative directions that cancel each other out in the aggregate. On the whole, therefore, feelings of social responsibility among respondents in the panel neither increased nor decreased in the past two years.<sup>2</sup> Correlations between the items measured in 2002 and 2004 ranged between .197 (the ‘difficult’ item 4) and .380 (item 7). Using the criterion for stability that respondents should not change in their opinions more than one standard deviation, 70.4% of the respondents who participated in both waves had stable views on social responsibility.

INSERT TABLE 4 HERE

#### *Internal validity*

Table 4 shows how the Philanthropy Scale is related to other types of other-regarding preferences. We see that views on social responsibility correlate positively with other prosocial motives. The only exception is extrinsic motives for philanthropy, which are not correlated with social responsibility. The strongest correlation is observed with the altruistic values scale (.42 and .44, respectively). As a rule, correlations with other concurrent measures of prosocial motives were stronger in 2004 than in 2002. This indicates that the 2004 measure was more valid (although it was about equally reliable as in 2002) and that it was a wise choice to measure motives in a separate session preceding the giving questionnaire. In sum, citizens who endorse social responsibility have more altruistic values, show greater empathic concern with others, have more often prosocial value orientations, have more trust in fellow citizens, are more strongly oriented towards the future, are less likely to attribute success and failure in life to personal qualities, and have more intrinsic motives for donations to charitable causes.

#### *External validity*

Table 5 tests our hypotheses on the correlates of social responsibility. Model 1 supports the hypotheses that parental socialization affects social responsibility. However, controlling for the respondent’s own characteristics, only a marginal effect of parental volunteering remains. Feelings of social responsibility increase with membership of Protestant (but not Catholic) religious groups. Church attendance and the level of education are the strongest predictors of social responsibility. Marriage fosters a sense of social responsibility, but not having children. Rural dwellers endorse social responsibility to the same extent as urbanites. Model 3 shows that most of the education effect is due to verbal intelligence. Higher incomes are less likely to endorse values of social responsibility. Social status, on the other hand, increases social responsibility.

INSERT TABLE 5 HERE

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<sup>2</sup> Note that this result does not reject our hypothesis that the behavioral effects of social responsibility increased in the recent past.

Table 6 shows the behavioral correlates of social responsibility, measured in 2002 (first column) and 2004 (second column). Our criterion variables are dichotomous: whether the household contributed to charities in eight different sectors in the past year. In the first two columns, we show results of Chi Square tests for the models introducing social responsibility in logistic regressions that already included all the key socio-demographic variables that were also included in model 4 of table 5. These tests indicate whether social responsibility adds to our understanding of philanthropy when key socio-demographic predictors are controlled for. We see in the first column that the fit of almost all regression models increases when social responsibility measured in 2002 is introduced, except contributions to religion, education and arts & culture. The second column shows that the 2004 measure of social responsibility also revealed relations with contributions to religion and arts & culture. This difference could be due to the fact that the Philanthropy Scale was measured before (instead of after) the criterion variables in 2004, but we cannot make definite claims about this.

INSERT TABLE 6 HERE

The odds ratios reported in columns three and four represent the standardized effects of social responsibility before and after controlling for the effects of other types of other-regarding preferences shown in table 4. In most cases we see that the effects of social responsibility decline when other types of other-regarding preferences are included in the regressions, but that social responsibility still has significant effects. In most cases, social responsibility still affects contributions to charitable causes when other motives are controlled for. The only exception is contributing to organizations defending animal rights: the effect of social responsibility disappears when other types of other regarding preferences are controlled. Social responsibility is most strongly related to causes in the sector of sports and recreation, and international aid. The relation with contributions to religious organizations, health charities and nonprofits in the arts and culture sector is somewhat weaker, but still significant. As expected, social responsibility is not related to contributions to education. The significant effect on religious contributions is surprising: we had not expected it. We will return to this finding later. In the final two columns, we present the effects of two other types of motives for philanthropy: internal locus of control and the ‘joy of giving’. While locus of control had the predicted negative relation with contributions to seven out of eight goals, its effects were usually non-significant. Joy of giving more often had significant effects: especially on contributions to health, international solidarity, and the environment. Joy of giving was also the motive that was responsible for partly mediating the effects of social responsibility.

INSERT TABLE 7 HERE

Table 7 shows the results of a regression analysis of the total amount donated to charities in the past year, based on global self-reports about donations in eight sectors (including religion). Model 4 shows effects of social responsibility (results of models 1-3 are discussed below). We observe a modest longitudinal effect of social responsibility ( $\beta=.058$ ) and a somewhat weaker effect of the concurrent measure ( $\beta=.050$ ).<sup>3</sup> The introduction of social responsibility slightly weakens the effects of parental volunteering, Protestant denomination and social status, but increases the estimated effects of volunteering by the respondent and income. The marginally significant effect of verbal intelligence disappears when social responsibility is included. Model 5 shows that the effects of both measures of social responsibility decline when other measures of prosocial motives for philanthropy are

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<sup>3</sup> In a model without the concurrent measure of social responsibility, the standardized longitudinal effect is .076.

included. Four of these measures are worth mentioning. An internal locus of control, measuring dispositional attributions for success and failure in life, and a prosocial value orientation decrease the amount of money donated, but a greater joy of giving and intrinsic motives for philanthropy increase the amount donated. The former two effects are marginally significant, the latter just fell below marginal levels of significance ( $p < .10$ ).

Models 1 to 3 also reveal interesting results. In line with previous research (Bekkers, 2004a; Bekkers, Hooghe & Stolle, 2005) model 1 shows significant socialization effects of the level of education, church attendance and volunteering by parents when the respondents were 15 years of age. The effects of parental education and church attendance disappear when the level of education and religiosity of the respondent are controlled in model 2. The effect of parental volunteerism declines, but remains significant. Net of socio-demographic characteristics, volunteering activities by the respondents do not increase the amount donated (as in Bekkers, 2002). Marriage and having (more) children do not increase the amount donated. Model 3 shows that the positive effect of the level of education found in model 2 is due to income ( $\beta = .074$ ) as well as social status ( $\beta = .059$ ), and to a smaller extent also to verbal ability ( $\beta = .046$ ,  $p < .086$ ). The effects of parental volunteering and church attendance decline in model 5, suggesting that other-regarding preferences are partly mediating their effects. Finally, the effect of own volunteering becomes significantly negative in model 5, suggesting that other-regarding preferences suppressed the effect of volunteering. In other words, those who volunteer without other-regarding motives tend to donate less.

#### INSERT TABLE 8 HERE

Table 8 shows the effects of social responsibility on the total amount donated in 2003 to 64 specific charities. Because churches were not mentioned, while the largest charities in the country as well as a selection of charities from each subsector, disparities between the results reported in table 7 and table 8 are mostly due to the fact that contributions to churches are excluded. We have argued above that social responsibility should be more strongly related to contributions to organizations other than Church. Because donations to church constitute a large portion of annual giving (Schuyt, 2003) the results of table 7 were driven largely by religious donations. Excluding religious donations should increase the effect of social responsibility. Indeed we observe stronger effects of social responsibility in the present analysis than in the preceding one. Here, the longitudinal effect of social responsibility is not significant ( $\beta = .050$ ,  $p < .169$ ) when the concurrent measure of social responsibility is included.<sup>4</sup> The size of the effect of the concurrent measure is substantial: it is not the largest effect in the model (which is the effect of age,  $\beta = .259$ ), but larger than the effect of income ( $\beta = .064$ ). A comparison with model 3 shows that social responsibility partly mediates the effects of the church attendance and the level of education on the amount donated. Model 5 shows that the effects of social responsibility are mediated by the joy of giving and internal locus of control.

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<sup>4</sup> In a model without the concurrent measure, the longitudinal effect is .080.

## Discussion and conclusion

In the present paper we have introduced social responsibility as a key motive for philanthropy. We have shown that over a period of two years social responsibility is a relatively stable social value, which is positively related to other types of prosocial motives, and has important consequences for philanthropy. Citizens accepting responsibility for the provision of public goods and the well-being of society at large are more likely to give to charities in a variety of subsectors, and these citizens also give more money, especially to non-religious causes. The value of social responsibility is endorsed more strongly by Protestants, more frequent church attendees, married persons, and the higher educated. The first three findings are in line with predictions from a Durkheimian perspective on social relations.

Other hypotheses from the same perspective were not supported: religious socialization, the number of children and living in a smaller community were not related to social responsibility (controlling for other indicators of social cohesion). The non-significant effect of religious socialization indicates that growing up in a religious environment does not instill an ethic of responsibility if this ethic is not maintained continuously. The non-significant effect of the number of children raises the question whether social responsibility is related to having children at all, because people may avoid to have many children from a social responsibility point of view. The non-significant effect of town size raises the question whether the effect of town size is linear. Perhaps suburban communities are those with the highest level of social responsibility (Oliver, 2001).

In line with the old 'noblesse oblige' idea that a higher social status imposes obligations on citizens, we found that the higher educated have a greater sense of responsibility not just because of their cognitive capacities, but also because of their higher level of social status. A higher income itself, however, was associated with a lower level of social responsibility (controlling for social status, verbal intelligence and the level of education). This finding suggests that increases in income beyond the level of others with similar social status and intelligence decrease the sense of responsibility for society as a whole.

A shortcoming that deserves attention in future research is the reliability of the measure of social responsibility, the Philanthropy Scale, which is only moderate. In future research we will investigate to what extent the reliability can be improved by taking response styles into account. Despite its moderate reliability, however, our philanthropy scale is more strongly correlated with philanthropic behavior than other attitude scales, measuring prosocial motives such as altruism, trust, or social value orientation.

Other topics that deserve attention in future research are the relation of social responsibility with other forms of civic engagement, such as volunteering and health related philanthropy (blood donation, post mortem organ donation). Although social responsibility seems most strongly related to traditional philanthropy, it can be expected that it is also related to other types of prosocial behavior that benefit society as a whole for which 'doing ones share' and 'helping fellow citizens' are relevant motives.

Finally, future research should test more systematically hypotheses on the mechanisms that explain the effect of social responsibility. We obtained some support for our prediction that those with a stronger sense of social responsibility give more because they are less likely to make dispositional attributions for success and failure in life, and are therefore more likely to perceive disadvantaged groups as deserving. However, the locus of control-scale we have used to test this prediction does not measure attributions for poverty or social exclusion directly, but a general attributional style. Direct measures of causal attributions of need among disadvantaged groups would have been better. In addition, alternative explanations should be tested. From a 'warm glow' theory of giving one would argue that accepting social

responsibility through philanthropy is rewarding because it reinforces a reputation or self-image of being a 'good citizen'. By 'doing one's share' people may feel good about themselves because they stand out as a good example for other citizens. This view implies a reciprocal relationship between philanthropy and social responsibility. Social responsibility is not simply a cause of philanthropy, but also its consequence. We surmise that the effect of social responsibility on philanthropy is stronger than vice versa: after all, it is necessary to endorse social responsibility values before one experiences the reward of reinforcing these values. With the availability of two waves of data in the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Survey these ideas can be tested.

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*Table 1. The Philanthropy Scale*

The next set of questions are about what people motivates to give money to charitable causes. We present to you a set of statements. To what extent do you agree with each of these statements?

Response categories: 1 – disagree completely; 2 – disagree; 3 – neither disagree, nor agree; 4 – agree; 5 – agree completely

- 
1. We have to leave this world a better place for the next generation.
  2. Each generation has to solve its own problems. \*
  3. Society is in danger because people are less concerned about each other nowadays.
  4. History proves that society will also continue to exist when people are less concerned about each other. \*
  5. The world needs responsible citizens.
  6. The world community relies on international politics and corporations, and that is a good thing. \*
  7. I give money to charitable causes, no matter what the government does.
  8. Charity and public benefit should be supported by the government, and not by citizens and business corporations. \*
- 

\* indicates that agreeing with the statement represents a lack of social responsibility among citizens

Table 2. Factor analyses on Philanthropy Scale items in GINPS01 and GINPS03

Item	GINPS01	GINPS03
1. We have to leave this world a better place for the next generation.	.628	.724
2. Each generation has to solve its own problems. *	.328	.364
3. Society is in danger because people are less concerned about each other nowadays.	.616	.541
5. The world needs responsible citizens.	.691	.691
6. The world community relies on international politics and corporations, and that is a good thing. *	.102	.285
7. I give money to charitable causes, no matter what the government does.	.605	.544
8. Charity and public benefit should be supported by the government, and not by citizens and business corporations. *	.448	.531
Eigen value	2.010	2.085
Percent of variance explained	28.711	29.791
Cronbach's Alpha	.553	.572

\* indicates that agreeing with the statement represents a lack of social responsibility among citizens. Negative items were recoded before factor analysis.

Table 3. Changes in social responsibility, 2002-2004

	2002	2004	$\delta$	$r$
1. We have to leave this world a better place for the next generation.	83.2%	86.9%	+3.7	.338
2. Each generation has to solve its own problems. *	81.0%	77.9%	-3.1	.294
3. Society is in danger because people are less concerned about each other nowadays.	74.5%	78.0%	+3.5	.295
4. History proves that society will also continue to exist when people are less concerned about each other. *	72.5%	64.1%	-8.4	.197
5. The world needs responsible citizens.	80.1%	86.3%	+6.2	.293
6. The world community relies on international politics and corporations, and that is a good thing. *	85.6%	89.4%	+3.8	.300
7. I give money to charitable causes, no matter what the government does.	47.8%	49.5%	+1.7	.380
8. Charity and public benefit should be supported by the government, and not by citizens and business corporations. *	83.0%	83.0%	0.0	.343
Number of items agreeing with	6.1	6.2	0.1	.341

\* indicates that agreeing with the statement represents a lack of social responsibility among citizens

$\delta$  indicates change in proportion of respondents agreeing between 2002 and 2004

$r$  indicates correlation between item in 2002 and 2004

*Table 4. Relations of social responsibility with other prosocial motives for philanthropy*

	2002	2004
Prosocial value orientation <sup>x</sup>	.118	.142
Generalized social trust <sup>y</sup>	.111	.148
Empathic concern <sup>z</sup>	.273	.437
Joy of giving <sup>z</sup>	.130	.212
Altruistic values <sup>y</sup>	.421	.444
Internal Locus of Control <sup>z</sup>	<sup>a</sup> -.084	-.089
Consideration of Future Consequences <sup>z</sup>	.143	.199
Intrinsic motives for philanthropy <sup>y</sup>	.306	.456
Extrinsic motives for philanthropy <sup>y</sup>	<sup>d</sup> -.014	<sup>d</sup> -.021

<sup>x</sup> measured in 2002; <sup>y</sup> measured in same year as social responsibility; <sup>z</sup> measured in 2004  
 All correlations  $p < .000$ , except <sup>a</sup>  $p < .01$  <sup>b</sup>  $p < .05$  <sup>c</sup>  $p < .10$  <sup>d</sup> ns

Table 5. Regression analysis of social responsibility in 2004 on respondent characteristics (standardised beta-coefficients)

	Family of origin	Respondent characteristics	Interpreting education effects	Philanthropy Scale in 2002
Female	.031	.018	.006	.006
Age	.054 (*)	.026	-.022	-.026
Parental level of education	.088 **	.036	.021	-.013
Parental volunteering	.091 **	.055 (*)	.050 (*)	.043
Parental church attendance	.133 ***	.023	.014	-.001
Catholic (vs. nonreligious)		.036	.039	.022
Reformed (vs. nonreligious)		.065 *	.060 (*)	.042
Rereformed (vs. nonreligious)		.063 (*)	.063 (*)	.029
Other religion (vs. nonreligious)		.062 (*)	.056 (*)	.036
Church attendance		.122 ***	.126 ***	.106 **
Volunteers		.031	.024	-.002
Level of education		.136 ***	.056 (*)	.024
Married		.109 ***	.103 ***	.078 **
Number of children		-.029	-.017	-.013
Community size		-.025	-.018	-.038
Verbal intelligence			.131 ***	.099 ***
Social status			.081 *	.069 *
Household income			-.053 (*)	-.043 (*)
Philanthropy Scale (2002)				.366 ***
Adj. R Square	.044	.093	.110	.231

\*\*\* p<.001; \*\* p<.01; \* p<.05; (\*) p<.10

All independent variables were measured in 2002, except verbal intelligence (2004)

Table 6. Effects of Philanthropy Scale on Charitable contributions in eight sectors (n=1,237)

	Chi Square Tests		Odds ratios			
	2002 <sup>a</sup>	2004 <sup>b</sup>	2004 <sup>c</sup>	2004 <sup>d</sup>	Joy	Locus
Religion	0.59	7.45 **	1.31 *	1.33 *	0.87	0.73 (*)
Health	7.83 **	21.41 ***	1.59 ***	1.48 ***	1.40 ***	0.77
International solidarity	35.85 ***	41.50 ***	1.60 ***	1.36 ***	1.24 *	0.93
Nature/Environment	30.26 ***	20.35 ***	1.37 ***	1.22 *	1.23 *	0.87
Animal Rights	10.33 **	7.88 **	1.23 **	1.05	1.23 *	0.90
Education	1.59	0.37	0.93	0.85	1.19	0.64 (*)
Arts and Culture	0.87	16.40 ***	1.54 ***	1.33 *	0.87	1.05
Sports and Recreation	9.28 **	21.99 ***	1.52 ***	1.47 ***	0.99	0.77

\*\*\* p<.001; \*\* p<.01; \* p<.05; (\*) p<.10

<sup>a</sup> Test for model adding social responsibility measured in 2002

<sup>b</sup> Test for model adding social responsibility measured in 2002

<sup>c</sup> Effect of social responsibility (measured in 2004) without controlling for other prosocial motives

<sup>d</sup> Effect of social responsibility (measured in 2004) after controlling for other prosocial motives

Table 7. OLS Regression analysis of total amount donated in 2003 (global self-reports, including church, among donors only, n=1,187)

	1. Family of origin			2. Respondent characteristics			3. Interpreting effects of education			4. Social responsibility			5. Other-regarding preferences		
	B	$\beta$	p	B	$\beta$	p	B	$\beta$	p	B	$\beta$	p	B	$\beta$	p
Female	19.73	.019		-2.83	-.003		-4.216	-.004		-6.77	-.007		-20.01	-.020	
Age	5.47	.171	***	6.12	.192	***	5.32	.167	***	5.32	.167	***	5.60	.176	***
Parental level of education	26.05	.091	**	6.80	.024		2.15	.007		.78	.003		1.14	.004	
Parental volunteering	73.50	.133	***	43.79	.079	**	42.72	.077	**	40.60	.073	**	35.72	.065	*
Parental church attendance	132.36	.243	***	-4.79	-.009		-6.53	-.012		-8.11	-.015		-7.99	-.015	
Catholic (vs. nonreligious)				-93.07	-.068	*	-92.19	-.068	*	-97.19	-.071	**	-99.20	-.073	**
Reformed (vs. nonreligious)				139.44	.092	**	141.57	.093	**	133.65	.088	**	134.42	.089	**
Rereformed (vs. nonreligious)				309.78	.187	***	315.67	.191	***	302.82	.183	***	296.96	.180	***
Other religion (vs. nonreligious)				363.81	.154	***	363.81	.154	***	350.67	.148	***	332.46	.141	***
Church attendance				150.71	.363	***	151.25	.365	***	147.41	.356	***	143.97	.347	***
Volunteers				-38.81	-.037		-37.48	-.036		-42.67	-.041	(*)	-52.92	-.050	*
Level of education				23.85	.089	***	7.80	.029		5.28	.020		1.70	.006	
Married				12.37	.012		-6.60	-.006		-16.09	-.015		-17.11	-.016	
Number of children				10.16	.010		9.28	.009		10.32	.010		13.88	.013	
Verbal intelligence							9.98	.046	(*)	7.75	.036		7.87	.036	
Social status							27.78	.059	*	25.08	.053	(*)	27.50	.058	*
Household income (x €1,000)							3.23	.074	**	3.39	.078	**	3.37	.077	**
Philanthropy Scale										30.58	.058	*	25.33	.048	(*)
Philanthropy Scale (in 2004) <sup>y</sup>										26.61	.050	(*)	12.50	.024	
Prosocial value orientation													41.15	.039	(*)
Generalized social trust													16.48	.032	
Consideration of future consequences <sup>y</sup>													-16.64	-.016	
Joy of giving <sup>y</sup>													28.58	.044	
Altruistic values													3.05	.006	
Empathic concern <sup>y</sup>													-1.75	-.002	
Intrinsic motives													36.34	.044	
Extrinsic motives													-4.40	-.006	
Internal locus of control <sup>y</sup>													-48.59	-.047	(*)
Constant	-54.79			-414.12		***	-497.51		***	-444.27		***	-557.99		***
Adj. R Square		.142			.371			.380			.387			.392	

\*\*\* p<.001; \*\* p<.01; \* p<.05; (\*) p<.10. All variables are measured in 2002, except those marked with an <sup>y</sup>.

Table 8. OLS Regression analysis of total amount donated in 2003 (61 specific organizations, excluding church, among donors only, n=1,187)

	1. Family of origin			2. Respondent characteristics			3. Interpreting effects of education			4. Social responsibility			5. Other-regarding preferences		
	B	$\beta$	p	B	$\beta$	p	B	$\beta$	p	B	$\beta$	p	B	$\beta$	p
Female	-16.73	-.035		-13.94	-.029		-14.05	-.029		-16.22	-.034		-16.81	-.035	
Age	3.67	.247	***	4.15	.279	***	3.82	.257	***	3.85	.259	***	3.98	.267	***
Parental level of education	18.09	.133	***	5.95	.044		4.77	.035		4.34	.032		3.67	.027	
Parental volunteering	11.41	.044		8.96	.035		8.47	.033		7.60	.029		4.98	.019	
Parental church attendance	10.43	.041		-12.50	-.049		-13.22	-.052		-14.58	-.057		-15.47	.011	
Catholic (vs. nonreligious)				14.06	.023		12.98	.021		10.59	.017		7.56	.012	
Reformed (vs. nonreligious)				106.65	.146	***	105.29	.144	***	100.98	.138	***	96.81	.132	***
Rereformed (vs. nonreligious)				16.16	.021		16.98	.022		8.73	.011		9.39	.012	
Other religion (vs. nonreligious)				3.86	.003		-.30	.000		-7.06	-.006		-16.31	-.014	
Church attendance				24.64	.127	***	25.29	.131	**	22.56	.117	*	20.32	.105	*
Volunteers				-39.24	-.080	*	-38.10	-.078	*	-39.16	-.080	*	-48.51	-.099	**
Level of education				18.33	.147	***	14.19	.114	*	12.42	.099	*	11.38	.091	*
Married				-39.73	-.080	*	-45.29	-.091	*	-53.53	-.107	**	-55.72	-.112	**
Number of children				2.09	.004		1.75	.004		2.73	.006		5.23	.011	
Verbal intelligence							5.48	.053		3.44	.033		2.69	.026	
Social status							1.46	.007		.09	.000		1.23	.006	
Household income (x €1,000)							1.03	.055		1.20	.064	(*)	1.24	.066	(*)
Philanthropy Scale										12.43	.050		7.92	.032	
Philanthropy Scale (in 2004) <sup>y</sup>										21.37	.089	*	11.14	.046	
Prosocial value orientation													18.37	.037	
Generalized social trust													6.32	.027	
Consideration of future consequences <sup>y</sup>													9.54	.020	
Joy of giving <sup>y</sup>													35.17	.116	**
Altruistic values													15.33	.062	
Empathic concern <sup>y</sup>													7.44	.020	
Intrinsic motives													-23.23	-.050	
Extrinsic motives													-27.71	-.077	*
Internal locus of control <sup>y</sup>													-28.15	-.058	(*)
Constant	-56.99			-146.38		**	-177.62		***	-141.07		**	-139.35		**
Adj. R Square	.069			.119			.122			.132			.143		

\*\*\* p<.001; \*\* p<.01; \* p<.05; (\*) p<.10. All variables are measured in 2002, except those marked with an <sup>y</sup>.